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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the dynamics of bank lending, deposit rates and interest rate spread in 
Mongolia using both accounting framework and Markov Regime-Switching approach. The 
empirical analysis suggests that the high lending rate in Mongolia is compatible with 
underdeveloped stock market, low savings ratio, inefficient operating costs of banks, high 
credit risk, high interbank market rate driven by unstable inflation, strong competition in 
deposit market and concentration in the loan market. Important findings stand out: (i) the 
accounting framework suggests that bank lending rate is high because of high deposit rate, 
while high interest rate spread mainly reflects operating costs and provision for loan losses; (ii) 
the results obtained from Markow Regime-Switching approach support the view that 
permitting asymmetry and non-linearity in responses of interest rate to changes in explaining 
factors are important in the interest rate analysis; (iii) effects of non-performing loan, inter-
bank market rate and growth of money supply on the interest rate spread, bank lending and 
deposit rates differ depending on the regime, while structure of loan and deposit markets, 
business cycle fluctuations, budget expenditure and stock market capitalization significantly 
affect both bank lending rate and interest rate spread regardless of the regime; and (iv) market 
structure, risks associated with lending operations (credit risk, interest rate risk, the interaction 
between the risks and inflation) and industrial product affect the lending rate transmitting 
through the interest rate spread, whereas the growth of M2 money and financial sector 
development influence the lending rate channeling through the deposit rate. 
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1. Introduction  
The banking sector plays a key role in the economy as it channels funds from lenders to 
borrowers. Bank lending rate can be decomposed as sum of bank deposit rate and the interest 
rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate). It is important that the financial intermediation by 
banks is performed with the low possible interest rate spread to achieve greater social welfare. 
Interest rate spread for all group of countries has declined over the last two decades. However, 
there is high diversity in interest rate spread across countries. According to the World Bank 
database, as of 2017, the interest rate spread is 5.9% for the World, 7.1% for lower middle-
income countries, 3.9% for South Asian countries and below 3% for OECD countries. For the 
resource dependent2 low-and lower-middle-income countries, the interest rate spread has 
declined from 12.8% to 7.7% during the period 2007-2017, however it is still high compared to 
those in other groups of countries. The existing literature (i.e., Ho and Saunders 1981, Maudos 
and Guevare 2004, Hannan and Berger 1989, 1991 and De Bondt 2005) suggests that interest 
rate spread and deposit rate depend on the degree of market competition, risks to which banks 
are exposed (interest rate risk, credit risk), and operating costs of banking sector, development of 
financial system, macroeconomic stability, legal environment and economic policies. However, 
factors explaining lending and deposit rates can vary across countries reflecting characteristics of 
the economy such as how the economy is dependent on resource sector. As resource abundant 
countries are highly vulnerable to external shocks such as commodity demand, commodity price 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) shocks, factors reflecting the fact may play a vital role in 
explaining interest rates in the countries. Thus, it is important to empirically analyze the 
determinants of interest rate spread, lending and deposit rates for resource abundant economies.  
This paper seeks to explain interest rate spread, lending rate and deposit rate in Mongolia-one of 
the most resource dependent countries, which are persistently high by comparison with other 
small and middle income countries, using both accounting framework and Markov Regime-
Switching approach. As of 2017, bank lending and deposit rates in Mongolia are 20% and 13%, 
respectively. This level of bank lending rate is 5 percentage points higher than the average of the 
middle-income countries, and about 10 percentage points higher compared to East Asia and 
Pacific countries3. This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, use of Markov 
Regime-Switching approach to examine determinants of bank lending rate, deposit rate and 
interest rate spread in a resource abundant country is its novelty in the literature. It is one of the 
first attempts to examine the regimes of lending rate, deposit rate and interest rate spread. 
Second, since the study uses a large data set including banks’ income statements, balance sheets 
(used for lending rate decomposition based on accounting framework), and aggregate 
macroeconomic and financial variables, it provides comprehensive analysis examining effects of 
 
2 A distinction is made between ‘resource dependent’ and ‘resource abundant’ countries in the paper. The natural 
abundance is measured by natural resource rents and natural resource dependence is represented by as a share of 
gross domestic product (Shahbaz et al. 2019). 
3
 According to the World Bank database, the interest rate spread (about 7 percent) is 1 percentage points higher 
compared to the average of the middle-income countries, and about 3 percentage points higher over East Asia and 
Pacific countries. 
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potential factors explaining lending and deposit rates in a commodity exporting economy. As far 
as we are aware, empirical studies on the same topic for resource abundant countries are rare in 
the literature.   
Existing studies have concentrated on analyzing factors determining the interest rate spread 
rather than lending rates. The theoretical and empirical literature on the interest rate spread is 
rich and mostly covers the euro area where banks play an important role in the financial sector. 
The dealership model proposed by Ho and Saunders (1981) shows that the degree of market 
competition and interest rate risk are key factors determining the interest rate spread. Allen 
(1988) applies her analysis to the model with two types of loans. Saunders and Schumacher 
(2000) apply the original model of Ho and Saunders (1981) to analyze the determinants of the 
interest margin by following a two-step process and find that macro policies consistent with 
reduced interest-rate volatility (i.e., low inflation policies) could have a positive effect in 
reducing bank margins. Demirgüç-Kunt (1999) shows that differences in interest margins reflect 
a variety of determinants such as bank characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, explicit and 
implicit bank taxation, deposit insurance regulation, overall financial structure, and underlying 
legal and institutional indicators. Maudos and Guevare (2004) extend the Ho and Saunders 
(1981) model by introducing (i) the influence of operating costs, (ii) credit risks, (iii) competitive 
structure of both lending and deposit markets, (iv) positive relationship between the interest rate 
spread and the size of banking operations, (v) opportunity cost of keeping reserves, and (vi) 
quality of management into the modelling of the interest margin. By applying the Ho and 
Saunders (1981) model to a multi-output framework, Valverde and Fernández (2007) find that (i) 
the relationship between bank margins and market power varies significantly across bank 
specializations, and (ii) the market power increases as output becomes more diversified towards 
non-traditional activities in the European banking sector.  
The literature suggests two opposing hypothesis about the impact of concentration on the pricing 
behavior of banks: ‘structure performance hypothesis’- banks will collude and use market power 
to extract rents from their customers and ‘efficiency structure hypothesis’- concentration would 
increase the overall efficiency of the sector. Hannen and Berger (1989) model bank deposit 
prices as a function of local concentration and find strong evidence in favor of structure 
performance hypothesis for the US banking market. Rhoades (1993) provides evidence against 
the efficiency structure hypothesis. Slovin and Sushka (1983) find that commercial banks operate 
in a market characterized by imperfect competition and they explicitly set loan rates. Using a 
simple Cournot model of bank pricing originally proposed by Jappelli (1993), Corvoisier and 
Gropp (2002) find that for loan and demand deposits, increasing concentration may have resulted 
in less competitive pricing by banks as expected by the model, whereas for savings and time 
deposits, the model is rejected. Hannen and Berger (1991) find that (i) deposit rates exhibit 
significantly more rigidity in concentrated markets and (2) deposit rates are significantly more 
rigid when the stimulus for the deposit rate change is upward. The presence of switching costs, 
market structure and regulatory restrictions are sources of market power, which lead banks to 
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quote lower rates on deposits and higher rates on loans (Berger et al. 2004, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 
2004).  
In this paper, the factors explaining the interest rate spread, bank lending and deposit rates are 
examined using Markow Regime-Switching approach developed by Quandt (1972) and Goldfeld 
and Quandt (1973). Markov Regime-Switching model is particularly useful in examining the 
interest rates since factors affecting interest rates and their effects can vary over time depending 
on the state of the economy. More generally, changes in business cycle conditions and monetary 
policy may affect real rates and expected inflation and cause interest rates to behave quite 
differently in different time periods. For instance, Ang and Bekaert (2002) show that regimes in 
interest rates correspond reasonably well with the US business cycle. Permitting asymmetry and 
non-linearity in responses of interest rate to changes in explaining factors are crucial in the 
interest rate analysis. Regime-switching models constitute an attractive class of models to 
capture these changes in the behaviour of interest rates. In economic analysis, Hamilton (1989) 
extends Markov-Switching regressions for AR processes and provided a nonlinear filter for 
estimation and shows that the modelling technique is useful in capturing the asymmetrical 
behaviour observed over expansions and recessions in the US business cycle. This technique has 
been used for analysing time-series properties and pass-through of interest rate (Garcia and 
Perron 1996, Ang and Bekaert 2002, Blagov et al. 2015) and exchange rate (Engel and Hamilton 
1990), however has not been employed in analysing factors explaining the interest rate spread 
and interest rates.  
 
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the background on the 
banking sector, dynamics of bank interest rates and decomposition of the lending rate based on 
an accounting framework in Mongolia. Section 3 describes theoretical and empirical modelling 
of the interest rate spread and deposit rate and discuss es Markov-Switching dynamic regression 
as the econometric methodology used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 describes the data 
employed and provides empirical results. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper with some policy 
implications and directions for future research. 
2. The country background and dynamics of bank interest rates  
2.1 Overview of the Mongolian banking sector 
Mongolia is one of the most resource dependent countries as the commodity exports (coal, 
copper, mineral fuels, iron ore and gold) of the economy account for around 90% of its total 
exports, which is about 40% of its total GDP. Mongolia has a relatively closed, bank-based 
financial system. Currently, 13 registered commercial banks account for 96% of total financial 
system asset, and the ratio of total bank loans to GDP is about 50%. Banks therefore play a vital 
role in the creation of money supply and in the transmission of monetary policy. Foreign banks 
are not present in Mongolia, however overseas financial institutions hold certain shares of 
domestic bank equities. Currently, banks rely more heavily on domestic deposits to finance their 
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loans, and only a few banks have access to international capital markets. The current level of 
dollarization in the bank balance sheets exposes the sector to risks. About a third of deposits and 
a fourth of loans are denominated in foreign currency. Banks’ foreign currency lending to 
unhedged borrowers renders the banking sector vulnerable to foreign exchange induced credit 
risk. Banking sector lending is highly concentrated in mining, construction, trading, and 
household sectors, as there are few investment opportunities available domestically. The 
Mongolian banking sector is characterized by extremely short maturities on financial liabilities, 
and therefore, the business loan term is relatively short (less than two years). Volatile capital 
flows and dollarization of domestic liability lead to exchange rate risk on banks or their 
customers, due to underdeveloped market tools for foreign exchange hedging. Furthermore, 
banks have relatively low capital compared to assets and are highly leveraged, making them 
more vulnerable to liquidity problems.  
Prior to July 2007, the Bank of Mongolia (BOM) had announced operating targets for monetary 
aggregates. During that period, monetary policy operated through a mixture of open-market 
operations and direct controls on bank interest rates, reserve requirements and various other 
balance sheet restrictions. The BOM managed the money market rate by operating in the market 
for settlement funds to achieve its operational targets, which meant that there was considerable 
volatility in the market rates. In July 2007, the BOM began announcing the policy rate (i.e., the 
desired level for the money market rate) as a new operational target of monetary policy. Since 
then, the BOM has been conducting independent monetary policy using the policy rate as its 
main instrument to signal its policy stance. The policy rate is set with the aim of influencing the 
aggregate demand and prices in the economy. As an operating target, it is periodically adjusted 
by the Monetary Policy Committee. In 2013, an interest rate corridor system was introduced in 
order to strengthen the interest rate channel of monetary policy.  
2.2 Anatomy of bank interest rates  
The efficiency of bank intermediation is measured using both ex-ante and ex-post spreads. The 
ex-ante spread is the difference between the contractual rates charged on loans and rates paid on 
deposits. The ex-post spread is the difference between banks’ actual interest revenues and their 
actual interest expenses. The ex-post spread differs from the ex-ante spread by the amount of 
loan defaults (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 1999).  
As shown in Figure 1, banks’ ex-ante (announced or before the event) lending rate declined until 
2012 when it reaches 15.5% per annum, before turning up thereafter. The downward trend of the 
lending rate was explained by both the narrowing of the interest rate spread and the reduction in 
deposit rate. As the economy was in the expansion phase during the period 2010-2011 driven by 
high amount of FDI inflows in the mining sector and rapid increases in export revenues, the 
domestic banks’ deposits rapidly increased, thereby intended to reduce the ex-ante deposit rate. 
During the expansion phase, banks had seen the credit risk as low, hence reduced the interest rate 
spread. Since super cycle of commodity prices ended and FDI in the mining sector stopped, 
6 
 
raising depreciation pressure and raising domestic economic uncertainty, banks immediately 
raised the interest rate spread in 2012 and started to increase the deposit rate. During the period 
2012-2016, the interest rate spread was relatively stable around 6.5%, and the upward trend in 
the lending rate is mainly explained by the rise in deposit rate. The gradual increase in the 
domestic currency deposit rate can be explained by high inflation and exchange rate depreciation 
during the period 2013-2016.  
Figure 1. Ex-ante bank lending and deposit rates and ex-ante interest rate spread, 
2008M12-2016M10 
 
  
     Source: Statistical Bulletin, Bank of Mongolia 
As emphasized by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), the ex-post spread is a more useful 
measure since it controls for the fact that banks with high-yield, risky credits are likely to face 
more defaults. As shown in Figure 2, the ex-post lending rate (actually earned rate) had a 
downward trend until 2014 when it reached 13% per annum, since then, it has started to increase 
and reached 16% per annum at the end of 2015. Net interest margin (ex post interest rate spread) 
has declined over time, and the recent upward trend of ex-post lending rate is mainly associated 
with upswing in ex post deposit rate.  
As of third quarter of 2016, the ex-ante bank lending rate is 20%, which is 5 percentage points 
higher compared to the ex-post lending rate. Enhhuyag (2005) provides some explanations on 
why the ex-post bank lending could be lower in the case of Mongolia: (i) banks extend maturity 
and change lending rates when they realize that their initial loan conditions do not properly 
match with the borrowers’ project, (ii) bank and borrower flexibly make amendments on the 
mutual loan agreement reflecting changes in domestic and external environments, (iii) according 
to the current regulation, overdue loans (exceeds 90 days) is included in total loans, but its 
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interest earning is not recorded in income statement as it is not paid. As ex-ante lending rate is 
calculated as loan interest earning to total loan ratio, it is estimated at low level, and (iv) 
increases in non-performing loans, stop of interest payments or weak enforcement operations on 
requiring full interest payments result in lower ex-post lending rate. Hence, banks may set higher 
ex-ante lending rate reflecting the expected loan default and its interest earning in the high credit 
risk environment.  
Figure 2. Ex-post lending and deposit rates and net interest margin, 2008Q2-2016Q3 
 
      Source: Author’s calculation based on banks’ income statements and balance sheets  
In what follows, the ex-post lending rate is decomposed using an accounting framework, which 
relies on the income statement and balance sheet of commercial banks. The ex-post lending rate 
is actual return on total loan outstanding measured in domestic currency and is received by banks 
‘after the fact- loans have been issued’. In the accounting framework, global factors affecting 
domestic ex-post lending rate is assumed to be captured in the exchange rate used to convert FX 
items in the income statement and balance sheet into domestic currency. 
The consolidated income statement of commercial banks defines profit before taxes (𝑃) as 
interest income (𝐼𝐼) plus noninterest income (𝑁𝐼𝐼), minus interest expense (𝐼𝑃), operating cost 
OC), and provisions for loan losses (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣). This identity can be rearranged and expressed as the 
interest margin (i.e., II – IP):  𝐼𝐼 − 𝐼𝑃 ≡ 𝑂𝐶 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣 + 𝑃 − 𝑁𝐼𝐼                                                                    (1) 
where interest income (𝐼𝐼) equals to sum of loan interest income (𝐿𝐼𝐼) and other interest income 𝑂𝐼𝐼) (𝐼𝐼 = 𝐿𝐼𝐼 + 𝑂𝐼𝐼), whereas interest expense (𝐼𝑃) equals to sum total of deposit interest 
expense (𝐷𝐼𝑃) and other interest expense (𝑂𝐼𝑃) (𝐼𝑃 = 𝐷𝐼𝑃 + 𝑂𝐼𝑃). 
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Dividing this expression by average deposit (𝐷) as a scaling factor, and using average loans (𝐿) 
and assets (𝐴), the following expression results:     𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿 ∗ 𝐿𝐷 − 𝐷𝐼𝑃𝐷 ≡ 𝑂𝐶𝐷 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐷 + 𝑃𝐴 ∗ 𝐴𝐷 − 𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐷 − 𝑁𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐷                                        (2) 
where 𝑃 𝐴⁄  = gross return on assets (ROA), NOII = OII – OIP is net other interest income. 
Using the fact that loan interest income is equivalent to average lending rate times the average 
volume of loans, and that deposit interest expense is equivalent to the average deposit rate times 
average deposits, the following expression for the lending rate results: 𝑟𝐿 ≡ 𝑟𝐷 + 𝛿𝑟𝐿 + 𝑂𝐶𝐷 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐷 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴 ∗ 𝐴𝐷 − 𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐷 − 𝑁𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐷                                      (3) 
where 𝑟𝐿 ≡ 𝐿𝐼𝐼 𝐿⁄  is lending rate, 𝑟𝐷 ≡ 𝐷𝐼𝐼 𝐷⁄  is deposit rate, 𝐿 𝐷⁄ ≡ (1 − 𝛿) is the loan to 
deposit ratio, and 𝛿 is ‘required reserve ratio’4. In the decomposition, 𝛿 varies each year 
depending on loan to deposit ratio. When large non-deposit liabilities (due to the BOM’s quasi 
fiscal operations) are used for lending in the banking system, 𝛿 is no longer required reserve 
ratio. Because of quasi-fiscal operation implemented by the BOM, the ratio 𝐿 𝐷⁄  for some years 
may exceed 1, and in such case, 𝛿 will be negative. Net other interest income (NOII = other 
interest income (OII) – other interest expense (OIP)) also affects the ex-post lending rate. 
Reductions in interest expenses on non-deposit liabilities reduce the spread, thereby the ex-post 
lending rate.  
The result of the decomposition of ex-post lending rate into its various components according to 
equation (3) is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Anatomy of the ex-post lending rate, in percent  
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016.Q3 Average 
     𝑟𝐿 16.2 16.1 15.1 12.3 13.5 11.6 13.3 14.8 14.0 14.2 
Decomposition:           
     𝑟𝐷 9.3 8.3 7.5 7.2 8.0 8.1 9.2 10.2 10.1 8.6 
Spread: 6.9 7.8 7.6 5.1 5.5 3.5 4.1 4.6 3.9 5.5 
    𝛿𝑟𝐿 -4.2 0.2 3.5 1.1 0.1 -2.4 -3.3 -3.1 -1.6 -1.1 
    𝑂𝐶 𝐷⁄  7.1 6.3 4.6 4.2 4.7 4.4 4.9 5.4 4.9 5.2 
    𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣 𝐷⁄  1.6 3.3 0.9 0.8 0.6 1.2 1.2 2.8 3.5 1.8 
    𝑅𝑂𝐴 ∗ 𝐴 𝐷⁄  4.1 0.1 2.5 4.1 3.7 4.2 3.8 2.6 1.1 2.9 − 𝑁𝐼𝐼 𝐷⁄  -2.3 -2.7 -2.6 -3.4 -3.0 -3.1 -2.5 -2.4 -3.1 -2.8 − 𝑁𝑂𝐼𝐼 𝐷⁄  0.7 0.6 -1.2 -1.6 -0.6 -0.7 0.0 -0.7 -0.9 -0.5 
Memorandum:  𝑅𝑂𝐴 2.3 0.1 1.7 2.6 2.2 1.8 1.7 1.2 0.5 1.6 𝐴 𝐷⁄ ∗ 100 182.6 167.7 147.2 154.6 169.7 233.4 222.0 225 227.2 192.2 
Source: Author’s calculation based on banks’ balance sheet and income statement. 
 
4
 In a simple framework where banks issue loans using only their deposits (even with zero equity), 𝛿 can be 
considered as ‘required reserve ratio’. 
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Table 1 reveals that the average ex-post lending rate actually earned by banks was about 14 
percent per annum over the period 2008-2016, and of which, about 8.5 percentage points was the 
ex-post deposit rate, whereas about 5.5 percentage point was the interest rate spread. On average 
approximately 7 percentage points of this spread was attributable to various costs- namely 
operation cost (5.2 percentage points) and provisions for loan losses (1.8 percentage points), and 
3 percentage points are associated with bank’s profitability. Positive net income from other 
activities (besides issuing loans and taking deposits) has allowed banks to lower the interest rate 
spread over the period. For instance, 2.8 percentage points and 0.5 percentage points of the 
spread are attributable to noninterest income and net other interest income, respectively.  
The ex-post lending rate was about 16% during the period 2008-2009, and reduced over high 
growth phase reaching 11.6% in 2013, mainly reflecting a decrease in the interest rate spread 
(i.e., declines in operating costs and loan loss provisions and increases in noninterest income). 
The lending rate has kept at a higher level during economic recessions (occurred for the period 
2008-2009 and 2015-2016) driven by adverse external shocks. The Mongolian economy has 
grown at annual rate of 7.9% on average for the period 2010-2018. However, the growth has 
been volatile over time as the economy frequently hits by external and domestic shocks. During 
the high growth phase occurring between 2011 and 2013, average annual growth stood at 13.7%, 
mainly contributed by high amount of FDI inflows, commodity export revenues and 
expansionary macroeconomic policies. Loose monetary and fiscal policies started in 2012 to 
buffer the economy from the external shocks supported the economic growth for a while (i.e., the 
period 2013- 2014), but at the cost of economic vulnerabilities. The growth plummeted to 1.2 
percent in 2016 because of unavoidable recession started since 2015 when FDI stopped, 
commodity demand and prices fell, and credit condition tightened. The slight increase in the 
lending rate observed over the period 2014-2016 was associated with both the deposit rate and 
the interest rate spread driven by increases in the deposit rate and loan loss provisions. Over the 
period, deposit rate increased by 2 percentage points, while interest rate margin rose by 1 
percentage point.  
The analysis reveals that bank profit behaves in a strong pro-cyclical manner, whereas the cost of 
loan loss provisions changes in a counter-cyclical manner. The profit component (𝑅𝑂𝐴 ∗ 𝐴 𝐷⁄ ) 
in Table 1 has decreased during the recession phases (i.e., 2008-2009 and 2015-2016), while it 
increased for the high growth phase. For instance, the component took value of 0.1 percentage 
point in 2009 when the economy is hardly affected by global financial crisis (GFC). Since then, 
it increased to 4.1 percentage point in 2011 and kept at the level during the period 2011-2014. 
Instead, the provision component (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣 𝐷⁄ ) increased during the recession phase (i.e., 3.3 
percentage point in 2009 from 1.6 percentage point in 2008) and decreased for the expansion 
phase. For instance, it is kept at the level of below 1.5 percentage point for the period 2010-2014 
but increased to 3.5 percentage level in 2016 when the economy faced with the recession.  
The average asset to deposit ratio of the banking system is high at 192.2%. This implies that 
large non-deposit liabilities are also used for lending in the Mongolian banking system, and 
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dynamics in interest expenses on non-deposit liabilities would also be important to explain the 
spread. The high asset to deposit ratio can be explained by the fact that the BOM has 
implemented quasi-fiscal operations during the period 2012-2016. The quasi-fiscal operations 
were implemented like policy lending programs targeted on specific sectors to spur economic 
growth when the economy was hit hard by adverse external shocks. The BOM injected cheaper 
liquidity to banks, which issued same amount of subsidized loans to the targeted sectors. As a 
result, banks’ assets have increased much quicker than their deposits. From Table 1, net other 
interest income (NOII) has contributed to reduce the spread, hence the ex-post lending rate for 
the period 2010-2016. The non-deposit liabilities of banks increased by the BOM’s subsidized 
lending program have resulted in reducing the ex-post lending rate as the financing sources were 
much cheaper compared to the deposit rates.  
Though the accounting framework used in the section is helpful to decompose the lending rate 
into the deposit rate and items contributing to the interest rate spread, the framework cannot 
provide any answers as to how the deposit rate and the interest rate spread would respond to 
changes in its determinants at the margin. To answer the question, in the next section, models for 
the analysis of the determinants of deposit rate and interest rate spread are discussed in detail.  
3. Modelling of lending rate, deposit rate and interest rate spread 
 
3.1 Theoretical framework 
It can be assumed that the lending rate (𝑟𝐿) is sum of deposit rate (𝑟𝐷) and interest rate spread 
(𝑠𝑝), which reflects costs of risk, operating cost, and profitability (𝑟𝐿 = 𝑟𝐷 + 𝑠𝑝). In what 
follows, models for analyzing determinants of interest rate spread and deposit rate are discussed.  
The starting point for examining factors explaining the interest rate spread is the dealership 
model of Ho and Saunders (1981). A couple of papers (i.e., Maudos and Guavare 2004, Valverde 
and Fernández 2007 and Entrop et al. 2015) extend the model and provide theoretical 
foundations for factors explaining the interest rate spread. In the models, a bank is viewed as a 
risk-averse dealer in the credit market, acting as an intermediary between demanders and 
suppliers of funds. The planning horizon is a single period during which the bank sets interest 
rates at the beginning of the period (before any deposits or loans are made) remain constant for 
the whole period. The banks, who are risk averse and have to deal with demands for loans, and 
offers of deposits, that reach them asymmetrically in time, must set interest rates on loans (𝑟𝐿) 
and deposits (𝑟𝐷) optimally so as to minimize the risk deriving from the uncertainty of interest 
rates in the money markets to which they have to resort in the event of excessive demand for 
loans or insufficient supply of deposits.  
The presented paper relies on the model of Maudos and Guevare (2004) that results the optimal 
interest rate spread (𝑠𝑝) as follows:  𝑠𝑝 = 𝑟𝐿 − 𝑟𝐷 = 12 (𝛼𝐷𝛽𝐷 + 𝛼𝐿𝛽𝐿) + 12 (𝐶(𝐿)𝐿 + 𝐶(𝐷)𝐷 )                                                                   
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      − 14 𝑈′′(?̅?)𝑈′(?̅?) [(𝐿 + 2𝐿0)𝜎𝐿2 + (𝐿 + 𝐷)𝜎𝑀2 + 2(𝑀0 − 𝐿)𝜎𝐿𝑀]                        (4) 
According to the theoretical models, factors explaining the interest rate spread are as follows: 
• Market power. The competitive structure of the banking industry is determined by the 
extent to which loan demand and deposit supply are inelastic with respect to the 
intermediation fees charged, represented by the factors 𝛽𝐿 and 𝛽𝐷.  The less elastic the 
demand for credit (or supply of deposits), the less will be the value of 𝛽, and the bank 
will be able to apply high margins if it exercises monopoly power. Consequently, 𝛼 𝛽⁄  
ratio proxies the possible monopoly profits implicit in bank margins.  
• Operating cost. The average operating cost 𝐶 incurred per unit of transaction volume 𝐿 
(or 𝐷), i.e., 𝐶(𝐿) 𝐿⁄ , 𝐶(𝐷) 𝐷⁄  is passed on to lenders and borrowers as in a standard 
monopolistic setting. Banks with higher personal costs associated with the new 
transaction (or having higher costs because they offer their customers more services) will 
charge higher fees in loans and deposits. When there is no market power or risk, positive 
margin compensates for costs.  
• Risk components. Risks associated with bank’s financial intermediation are as follows:   
o Risk aversion. In the model, this component is measured by the coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion, − 𝑈′′(?̅?) 𝑈′(?̅?)⁄ , where on the assumption that the bank 
is risk-averse, 𝑈′′(?̅?) < 0, the former expression is greater than zero. Certainly, 
the more risk-averse bank will charge higher margins. 
o Interest rate risk. The high volatility of money market interest rate (𝜎𝑀2 ) implies 
the greater market risk, and it will therefore be necessary to operate with higher 
margins as banks will require a higher premium at the margin.  
o Credit risk. It is captured by 𝜎𝐿2. The greater the uncertainty or the volatility of 
the expected return on the loans granted (risk of default), the greater will be the 
margin with which the bank works.  
o Covariance or interaction between interest rate risk and credit risk (𝜎𝐿𝑀). Banks 
are prone to joint occurrence of credit and interest rate risks. For example, when 
the expected loan repayment is not made on time, banks may need to borrow 
from the money market to maintain liquidity requirement or issue new loans. The 
co-occurrence of the two risks can be differently reflected in interest rate spread 
compared to occurrence of each risk. Hence, the interaction between interest rate 
risk and credit risk is considered as an independent determinant of interest rate 
spread. The greater the interaction, the greater will be the spread.  
• The size of banking operation. The interest rate spread is also affected by the average 
size of the credit and deposit operations undertaken by the bank (𝐿 + 𝐷),  the total 
volume of loans (𝐿 + 2𝐿0) and gap between supply of capital in the money market 𝑀0 
and loan (𝐿) ,(𝑀0 − 𝐿). The model predicts the unit margins are an increasing function 
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of the average size of operations. The potential loss will be greater for those banks in 
which the volume of credits granted is greater.  
3.2 Empirical approach 
A number of papers (i.e., McShane and Sharpe 1985, Angbazo 1997, Maudos and Guevare 2004, 
Valverde and Fernández 2007 and Entrop et al. 2015) use a single-stage approach or directly 
study factors explaining the interest rate margin. In this paper, the empirical analysis follows the 
single-stage approach and uses publicly available time-series data. Therefore, the reduced-form 
empirical equations of the bank lending rate, deposit rate and interest rate spread should include 
these sub-grouped variables:  𝑦𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑆𝑡(∙), 𝑅𝑡(∙), 𝑂𝐸𝑡(∙), 𝑀𝑡(∙), 𝜀𝑡)                                                                       (5) 
where 𝑦𝑡 ∈ {𝑟𝐿,𝑡, 𝑟𝐷,𝑡, 𝑠𝑝𝑡} is the dependent variable, which will be bank lending rate, deposit 
rate, and interest rate spread, 𝑆𝑡(∙) is a vector of market structure variables, 𝑅𝑡(∙) is a vector of 
risk variables determining the interest rate spread5, 𝑂𝐸𝑡(∙) is a vector of banks’ operation 
variables, 𝑀𝑡(∙) is a vector of macroeconomic control variables and 𝜀𝑡 is the error term. These 
vectors of variables are selected in the estimation as:  
Market structure, 𝑆𝑡(∙). Concentration ratio (𝐶𝑅) and Herfindahl index (𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹) of bank loan and 
deposit markets are used as proxies for market structure variables (𝛼𝐷 𝛽𝐷⁄  and 𝛼𝐿 𝛽𝐿⁄ ). Low 
concentration or strong competition in deposit market may result in an increase in the bank 
deposit rate. In the highly concentrated loan market, big banks may exercise their market power 
to keep the interest rate spread at the high level.   
Risk components, 𝑅𝑡(∙). Proxies for risks are selected as follows:  
• Credit risk (𝜎𝐿2). As an observable and standard indicator, non-performing loan to total 
loan ratio (𝑁𝑃𝐿) is chosen for the proxy of credit risk in the estimation. Banks with 
higher NPL ratio may raise the interest rate spread (as well as lending rate) to cover the 
expected loss and to dampen the demand for loan, of which quality is worsening.  
• Interest rate risk (𝜎𝑀2 ). As financial markets are underdeveloped (i.e., there are no 
frequent contracts in the market) in Mongolia, time-varying measures for market implied 
interest rate risk are not available. GARCH volatility of the interbank market interest rate 
(𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑆𝐷) is used as a proxy for the interest rate risk. The GARCH volatility is a popular 
way to measure the time-varying volatility of the IBRSD. The high volatility of the 
interest rate implies the greater uncertainty about the funding cost on the money market, 
and banks will require a higher premium at the interest rate spread.   
• Credit- interest rate risk covariance (𝜎𝐿𝑀). The product of 𝑁𝑃𝐿 and 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑆𝐷 is used to 
proxy for the interaction between credit and interest rate risks. The expected coefficient 
 
5
 This vector of variables is not included in the deposit rate equation. 
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sign can be expected as positive since bank will require higher premium to capture the 
coexistence of the risks.  
The size of banking operation, 𝑂𝐸𝑡(∙). Annual growth of M2 money is used as proxy for the size 
of banking operation. Banks’ main operations include taking deposits and issuing loans. The 
broad money (M2) consists of both deposits and loans. Hence, the broad money is a standard 
measure capturing size of banking operations. In this regard, the M2 growth can be a determinant 
of the lending rate. M2 growth may have different effects on the interest rate spread and deposit 
rate. For instance, the potential loss will be greater for a big banking sector in which the volume 
of M2 (or credit) is greater. To reflect the potential loss, the interest rate spread will be higher. 
On the other hand, larger the size of the banking sector, greater could be its competitive 
advantage, and therefore lesser the interest rate spread charged by banks. Moreover, the high M2 
growth (greater supply of deposits) may result in lower deposit rates. Therefore, the overall 
impact of M2 growth on the lending rate can be only determined from empirical analysis.  
Macroeconomic control variable, 𝑀𝑡(∙). This vector of variables is chosen as follows:  
• Money market interest rate. Weighted average inter-bank market interest rate (𝐼𝐵𝑅) is 
used for the proxy of money market interest rate. De Bondt (2005) shows how money 
market interest rate (or policy rate) affects bank deposit and lending rates using a 
standard marginal cost pricing model.  
• Inflation. Annual inflation (𝐼𝑁𝐹) is used since the annual lending rate is observed as the 
dependent variable in the estimation. Inflation and its expectation integrate effects of 
nominal contracting. For example, they are the key factors affecting customer’s decision 
to deposit their fund at the deposit rate offered by banks. In addition, inflation is itself a 
key indicator of macroeconomics risk. Thus, it is expected to have a positive influence on 
the interest rate spread.  
• State of the economy. The cyclical component of industrial product (𝐼𝑃_𝐺𝐴𝑃) is used to 
proxy the state of the economy. The cyclical component of the variable is calculated 
using Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter for seasonally adjusted data. Deposit rate may decline 
during the economic expansion period and may increase during the economic recession 
as observed in the Section 2.2. According to the financial accelerator theory, the spread 
between the lending rate and risk-free interest rate will increase during the economic 
recession.  
• Development of stock market. Annual growth of the market capitalization (𝐺_𝑆𝑀) is used 
to proxy the development of the stock market. Banking sector and stock market are 
alternative choices for the large companies which are looking for financing and for 
investors who have sufficient fund. High bank deposit rates may adversely affect the 
14 
 
development of stock market since people prefer to place deposits at the banks. In such 
case, the banking sector is a substitute rather than complement for stock market.  
• Government budget. Growth of budget expenditure (𝐺_𝐹𝐶) is selected for proxy of fiscal 
policy. When the budget deficit is financed from the domestic market, it will crowd out 
private investments and credits since banks might prefer to purchase government 
securities rather than issuing new loans. In addition, the higher government expenditure 
may result in higher inflation. Segura-Ubiergo (2012) shows that the effect of fiscal 
policy on the lending rate is strong in Brazil-one of the countries with high interest rates.  
3.3 Econometric methodology: Markov-Switching dynamic regression 
In the empirical analysis, Markov-switching regression is employed based on the pre-determined 
empirical result (i.e., Ang and Bekaert 2002) that interest rates behave quite differently in 
different time periods. The method permits asymmetry and non-linearity in responses of interest 
rate to changes in explanatory variables. Since there is no sufficient evidence that all explanatory 
variables correspond with regime changes, Markov-Switching Vector Autoregressive model 
(MS-VAR) is not considered in the analysis. 
To study the determinants of bank lending rate, deposit rate and interest rate spread shown in 
equation (5), the following general specification of the Markov-switching dynamic regression is 
used:  𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎(𝑠𝑡) + 𝐵1𝑥𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝐵𝑝𝑥𝑡−𝑝 + 𝐴1(𝑠𝑡)𝑧𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝐴𝑞(𝑠𝑡)𝑧𝑡−𝑞 + 𝜀𝑡                (6) 
where 𝑦𝑡 is the dependent variable at time 𝑡, 𝑠𝑡 represents the state, 𝑎(𝑠𝑡) is the state-dependent 
intercept, 𝑥𝑡 is a vector of exogenous variables (some variables of 𝑆𝑡(∙), 𝑅𝑡(∙), 𝑂𝐸𝑡(∙), 𝑀𝑡(∙)) 
with state-invariant coefficients 𝐵, 𝑧𝑡 is a vector of exogenous variables (some variables of 𝑆𝑡(∙), 𝑅𝑡(∙), 𝑂𝐸𝑡(∙), 𝑀𝑡(∙)) with state-dependent coefficients 𝐴(𝑠𝑡), 𝑝 and 𝑞 are time lags, 𝜀𝑡 is an 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) normal error with  mean 0 and state-invariant 
variance  (𝜀𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎2)). 𝑥𝑡 and 𝑧𝑡 may contain lags of 𝑦𝑡. State-dependent coefficients 
(i.e., 𝑎(𝑠𝑡), 𝐴(𝑠𝑡)) takes different values depending on states (𝑠𝑡 = {1, … , 𝑘}, where 𝑘 is the 
number of states).  
Markow-Switching model analyses have been conducted recently in economic studies. Markov-
Switching model becomes an alternative to the linear model by allowing change in parameters, 
but they are used for series that are believed to transition over a finite set of unobserved states, 
allowing the process to evolve differently in each state. The transitions occur according to a 
Markov process. The time of transition from one state to another and the duration between 
changes in state is random. Thus, these models can be used to understand the process that 
governs the time at which interest rate transitions between rise and fall and the duration of each 
period.  
The Markov-switching regression model used in this paper assumes that the Markov state 
variable governing the timing of regime switches is exogenous.  This assumption is a limitation 
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of the methodology since some papers (i.e., Kim et al. 2008, Kang (2014) and Hwu et al. 2020) 
have recently developed ‘endogenous switching’ model, in which latent state variable driving the 
regime switching is endogenous, and found evidence in favor of endogenous switching model. 
The use of the endogenous switching model in analyzing lending rate dynamics is left to the 
future research. 
4. Data and empirical results 
 
4.1 Data 
The data used in this paper includes monthly time series of weighted average bank lending rate, 
weighted average bank deposit rate, the interest rate spread (the bank lending rate minus the bank 
deposit rate), weighted average inter-bank market rate, annual inflation, NPL ratio, total loans, 
total deposits, industrial product (at 2010 constant prices), annual growth of M2 money, annual 
growth of stock market capitalization, growth of budget expenditure, concentration ratios and 
Herfindahl indexes of loan and deposit markets of the banking sector. All interest rate and 
change variables are measured in percentage, and natural logarithm is taken for level variables in 
the estimation. The analysis of the bank lending rate covers the period from December 2002 to 
October 20166. However, the analyses of the bank deposit rate and the interest rate spread cover 
the period from December 2008 to October 2016 as the data on the bank deposit rate are only 
available since December 20087. The cyclical component of industrial product (IP_GAP) is 
measured using Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter for seasonally adjusted data of 12 months moving 
average of industrial product as there is the strong volatility in the industrial product. Both 
concentration ratios and Herfindahl indices in loan and deposit markets are calculated using 
individual banks’ loan and deposit. The data series are obtained from monthly statistical bulletins 
of the Bank of Mongolia and the National Statistics Office of Mongolia. 
4.2 Empirical results 
In time series econometric analysis, it is required to test the unit root of time series in the 
regression. Many studies (i.e., Hamilton 1989, Cecchetti and Mark 1990 and Engel 1994) that 
employ a Markov-switching variance or trend growth rate simply assume a unit root in the series 
of interest. The Phillips-Perron test is used in the pre-testing of the unit root, and the results show 
that both lending and deposit rates sampled in the paper are I(1). The non-linearity in the series 
of the bank lending rate, deposit rate and the interest rate spread is also tested using both 
Ramsey-RESET test and BDS statistics suggested by Brock et al. (1987), and the results show 
that the null hypothesis of linearity of the series is rejected for all variables. As pre-conditions 
are met for the use of Markov-Switching model, the models for the lending rate, the deposit rate 
and the interest rate spread are estimated. In the estimation, two states are assumed considering 
the relatively short sample size and stationary residuals of each estimated model.  
 
6
 The sample starts from December 2002 as the inter-bank market rate is only available since then.  
7
 Prior to December 2008, the Bank of Mongolia did not calculate the weighted-average deposit rate. 
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Table 2. Markov-Regime Switching regressions for lending rate, interest rate spread and  
              deposit rate  
Lending rate (𝑟𝐿,𝑡)  Interest rate spread (𝑠𝑝𝑡)  Deposit rate (𝑟𝐷,𝑡) 
Sample: 2002M12-2016M10 
 
Sample: 2008M12-2016M10  Sample: 2008M12-2016M10 
Variables Coefficients  Variables Coefficients  Variables Coefficients 
Regime 1 
 
Regime 1  Regime 1 
Constant  29.2***  Constant 5.94***  Constant  13.8*** 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑡−4  0.01  𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑡−4 0.05  𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑡−1  0.05* 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡−5  0.44***  𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡−5 0.34***  𝐺_𝑀2𝑡−6 -0.02*** 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑆𝐷𝑡  0.34***  𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑆𝐷𝑡 1.18***  𝐼𝑃_𝑀𝐴_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡−3 -0.07*** 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑆𝐷𝑡−3× 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡−3  0.06****  𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡−2 0.27***    𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡−2 -0.10       𝐺_𝑀2𝑡−6 -0.02***       
Regime 2  Regime 2  Regime 2 
Constant  21.2***  Constant  3.64*  Constant  14.7*** 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑡−4  0.23***  𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑡−4  0.22***  𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑡−1  0.07*** 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡−5  0.86***  𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡−5  0.39***  𝐺_𝑀2𝑡−6 -0.02*** 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑆𝐷𝑡  0.04  𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑆𝐷𝑡 -0.09  𝐼𝑃_𝑀𝐴_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡−3  0.002 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑆𝐷𝑡−3× 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡−3  0.03*  𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡−2 -0.02     𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡−2  0.45***       𝐺_𝑀2𝑡−6  0.05***       
General  General  General 𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝐷𝑡 -0.01***  𝐶𝑅5_𝐷𝑡 -0.15***  𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝐷𝑡 -0.001*** 𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝐿𝑡  0.006**  𝐶𝑅2_𝐿𝑡  0.20***  𝐺_𝑆𝑀𝑡−3 -0.001* 𝐼𝑃_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 -0.03***  𝐼𝑃_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 -0.01***  𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝜎𝑡2)  -1.64*** 𝐺_𝑆𝑀𝑡−1 -0.007***  𝐺_𝑆𝑀𝑡−1 -0.02***    𝐺_𝐹𝐶𝑡−1  0.004***  𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝜎𝑡2)  -0.70***    𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝜎𝑡2)  -0.20***       
Transition matrix  
parameters 
 Transition matrix  
parameters 
 Transition matrix  
parameters 𝑝11: Constant  4.31***  𝑝11: Constant   5.17***  𝑝11: Constant  3.25*** 𝑝11: 𝐺_𝐿𝑡−3 -0.48**  𝑝21: Constant  -6.83**  𝑝21: Constant -4.38*** 𝑝21: Constant -2.15***       𝑝21: 𝐺_𝐿𝑡−3  0.13       
Log-likelihood -233.3  Log-likelihood  -92.0  Log-likelihood  12.62 
Note: ***  𝑝 < 0.01; ** 𝑝 < 0.05;  *** 𝑝 < 0.10.  
 
Table 2 shows the estimated parameters for the models. All explanatory variables determined 
from the theoretical framework are remained in the estimated equations, and the lag selection 
procedure of explanatory variables is based on a sort of the general-to-specific approach8. The 
general-to-specific modelling is a central method for selecting useful empirical models and 
 
8
 Up to 12-time lags are considered for all explanatory variables, and the selected model is based on the criteria that 
log-likelihood increases when a variable is dropped from the regression. As it is empirical analysis, whether the 
coefficient is statistically significant, and the sign of the coefficient is in line with economic meaning are also 
considered in the selection of the model.  
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allows to simplify an initially general model that adequately characterize the empirical evidence 
within the theoretical framework (Campos et al. 2005).  
The effect of the inter-bank market rate (𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑡−4), NPL ratio (𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡−5), inflation (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡−2), 
change in M2 money (𝐺_𝑀2𝑡−6), standard deviation of the inter-bank market rate (𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑆𝐷𝑡) and  
product of the inter-bank market rate and NPL ratio (𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑆𝐷𝑡−3 × 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡−3) on the lending rate (𝑟𝐿,𝑡) varies depending on the regime. Constant term, the NPL ratio, the change in M2 money 
and the standard deviation of the inter-bank market rate are found significant in determining the 
lending rate for both regimes.  
As expected, risk components (the NPL ratio and product of the NPL ratio and the standard 
deviation of inter-bank market rate) are positively correlated with the lending rate. The time lag 
of 5 months may reflect the fact that NPLs transfer to the loss after some lags, therefore banks 
re-set their lending rates to cover the costs regarding to the credit risks. The change in M2 money 
is negatively correlated with the lending rate in the regime 1, but positively correlated in the 
regime 2. The regime 1 is for higher lending rate, while the regime 2 is for relatively lower 
lending rate. The interest rate risk (the standard deviation of inter-bank market rate) is significant 
and positively correlated with the lending rate in the regime 1, while the inter-bank market rate 
(𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑡−4) and inflation (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡−2) are significant and positively correlated with the lending rate in 
the regime 2. 
The time-lag and the magnitude of the coefficient on the interbank market rate imply that the 
interest rate pass-through from the policy rate to the lending rate is slow, incomplete and changes 
over time. The result is in line with the finding reported by Gan-Ochir and Kaliappa (2016). In 
addition, the effect of the NPL ratio on the lending rate is stronger in the regime 2.  
Regardless of the regime, competitive structures of loan (𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝐿𝑡) and deposit (𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝐷𝑡) 
markets, the state of the economy (𝐼𝑃_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡), the development of stock market (𝐺_𝑆𝑀𝑡−1) and 
the government budget (𝐺_𝐹𝐶𝑡−1) have significant effects, and signs of the significant 
coefficients are as expected. As end of 2017, Herfindahl indices of credit and deposit markets 
take values of 0.17 and 0.20, respectively. The result may indicate that moderate level of 
concentration (or relatively weak competition) exists in the markets. More concentration in the 
credit market leads to higher lending rate, while concentration in the deposit market results in 
lower deposit rate and lending rate. Moreover, business cycle and change in budget expenditure 
are reflected in the lending rate. A positive change in budget expenditure starts to raise the 
lending rate after one month, and the lending rate decreases during the expansion phase of the 
business cycle. Another interesting result is that change in stock market capitalization has 
positive and significant impact on the lending rate, even though the impact is weak.  
The growth of bank loans (𝐺_𝐿𝑡−3) significantly affects the probability that bank lending rate 
remains in the regime of high lending rate. For instance, the growth of bank loans reduces the 
probability. The estimated probabilities of transition from one regime to the other (𝑃) are as 
follows: 𝑝11 = 0.93 (standard deviation of 0.1), 𝑝12 = 0.07 (standard deviation of 0.1), 𝑝22 =
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0.86 (standard deviation of 0.05), 𝑝21 = 0.14 (standard deviation of 0.05). The expected 
(average) duration that the bank lending rate spends in the regime of high lending rate is 14 
months9, while the expected duration of the low lending rate regime is about 7 months. 95% 
confidence interval for the duration that the bank lending rate spends in the high lending rate 
regime is [7.5, 33.3] months, while 95% confidence interval for the duration of low lending rate 
regime is [3.7, 16.3] months. The results suggest that the lending rate spends a significant 
amount of time in both regimes. Estimated probabilities of being in the higher lending rate state 
(regime 1) and being in the lower lending rate state (regime 2) are shown in Figure 3.  
Figure 3. Estimated probabilities that bank lending rate remains in regime 1 and regime 2 
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If we classify as higher lending rate state for those months with an estimated probability 
exceeding 0.7, the identified episodes of the state occurred between January 2009 and September 
2014 (except for February 2012). The lending rate have been in the lower lending rate state since 
October 2014. This result presents that the recent movements in the bank lending rate can be 
explained by the relationship among variables under the low credit growth state (the regime 2).  
Markov-switching models of the interest rate spread and the bank deposit rate are also estimated 
to identify what factors affect the bank lending rate through changing the two components as 
well as to formulate policy guidance on lowering the interest rate spread and bank deposit rate. 
The results are shown in the last 2 columns of Table 2.  
The results show that the impacts of the inter-bank interest rate on the bank deposit rate and the 
interest rate spread are statistically significant (only in regime 2 for the interest rate spread). 
Structure of deposit market, stock market development and business cycle also affect both the 
bank deposit rate and the interest rate spread. For proxy variables for business cycle, the 
industrial production gap (𝐼𝑃_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡) affects the interest rate spread, while the gap measured 
based on 12-month moving average of industrial production (𝐼𝑃_𝑀𝐴_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡−3) affects the bank 
 
9
 This expected duration that the lending rate spends in regime 1 is estimated as 𝐸(𝐷1) = 1 (1 − 𝑝11)⁄ = 14.3 
months.  
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deposit rate only in the regime 1. Herfindahl index of deposit market (𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝐷𝑡) has an impact on 
the bank deposit rate, while the concentration ratio of deposit market (𝐶𝑅5_𝐷𝑡) calculated 
covering top 5 banks significantly affect the interest rate spread.   
NPL ratio (𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡−5) affects the interest rate spread in both regimes, while the impacts of 
inflation (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡−2) and interest rate risk (𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑆𝐷𝑡) on the interest rate spread are statistically 
significant in only regime 1. The regime 1 is for lower interest rate spread, while the regime 2 is 
for higher interest rate spread. Regardless of the regime, structure of credit market (𝐶𝑅2_𝐿𝑡) 
affects the interest rate spread. Change in M2 money (𝐺_𝑀2𝑡−6) has statistically significant 
effect on the bank deposit rate. These results are in line with theoretical assumptions in the sense 
that credit market structure, risks associated with lending activities affect the interest rate spread, 
while growth of deposit affect the bank deposit rate. The results shown in Table 2 are in line with 
findings of studies conducted in Mongolia (i.e., Boldbaatar 2006, Gan-Ochir 2009 and Gan-
Ochir and Kaliappa 2016).  
Figure 4. Estimated probabilities that interest spread remains in regime 1 and regime 2 
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The probability of regime transition is exogenously determined for estimated models of the 
interest rate spread and the bank deposit rate. Probabilities of regime transition for the interest 
rate spread equation are estimated as follows: 𝑝11 = 0.87, 𝑝12 = 0.13, 𝑝22 = 0.76, 𝑝21 = 0.24. 
The average duration that the interest rate spread spends in regime 1 is 7.6 months, while the 
average duration of regime 2 is 4.2 months. 95% confidence interval for the duration that the 
bank deposit rate spends in regime 1 is [4.0, 17.7] months, while 95% confidence interval for the 
duration of regime 2 is [2.2, 8.9] months. The results suggest that the interest rate spread spends 
a significant amount of time in the lower interest rate spread state (regime 1) compared to the 
higher interest rate spread state (regime 2). Estimated probabilities of being in the lower interest 
rate spread state and being in the higher interest rate spread are shown in Figure 4.  
When we classify lower interest rate episodes as spread those months with an estimated 
probability of being in the lower spread state exceeding 0.7, the identified episodes of lower 
interest rate spread (regime 2) occurred since January 2016. This implies that NPL ratio, 
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inflation, interest rate risk, market structure (𝐶𝑅5_𝐷𝑡 and 𝐶𝑅2_𝐿𝑡), economic activity and stock 
market development significantly affect recent movements in the interest rate spread.   
Probabilities of regime transition for the bank deposit rate equation are estimated as follows: 𝑝11 = 0.96, 𝑝12 = 0.04, 𝑝22 = 0.99, 𝑝21 = 0.01. The expected durations that the bank deposit 
rate respectively spends in the lower deposit rate state (regime 1) and the higher deposit rate state 
(regime 2) are 27 months and 80 months, respectively. For the ex-ante deposit rate, the duration 
of being in a certain regime is much longer compared to those of the ex-ante lending rate and the 
interest rate spread. It is in line with the fact that the ex-ante deposit rate is sticky, reflecting 
strong competition among banks in the deposit market and high and volatile inflation. Estimated 
probabilities of being in the lower deposit rate state (regime 1) and being in higher deposit rate 
state (regime 2) are shown in Figure 5.  
Figure 5. Estimated probabilities that bank deposit rate remains in regime 1 and regime 2 
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If we classify as higher deposit rate those months with an estimated probability of being in the 
higher deposit rate state exceeding 0.7, the identified episodes of higher deposit rate occurred 
during the recession phase of the economy (i.e., 2009 and 2014-2016). However, the lower 
deposit rate episodes occurred during the expansion phase of the economy, covering the period 
2011-2013. The result suggests that the state of deposit rate (i.e., regime 1 or regime 2) depends 
on phases of the business cycle in Mongolia.   
The lending rate was in regime 1 (the state of higher lending rate) when deposit rate was in 
regime 2 (the state of higher deposit rate) and the interest rate spread was in regime 1 (the state 
of lower interest rate spread) for the period 2011-2013. From Table 2, the deceleration of M2 
growth increases the deposit rate, which leads to the rise in the lending rate. However, the lower 
NPL ratio and stable interbank market rate lead to the lower interest rate spread. 
From comparisons of the identified episodes, it is certain that the transition of the bank lending 
rate from the higher lending state (regime 1) to the lower lending state (regime 2) between 
August 2013 and September 2014 has been mainly driven by changes in the interest rate spread 
since episodes of lower spread and higher deposit rate occurred during the period. The lending 
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 2 
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rate has been in regime 2 (the state of lower lending rate) when deposit rate is in regime 2 (the 
state of higher deposit rate) and the interest rate spread is in regime 1 (the state of lower interest 
rate spread) since the beginning of 2015. The deceleration of M2 growth increases the deposit 
rate, while lower NPL ratio and stable interbank market rate lead to the lower interest rate 
spread. Another observation is that the interest rate spread frequently change its regimes, in 
which factors affecting to it are different. 
5. Conclusion  
This paper has examined factors to explain high interest rates in Mongolia by using both an 
accounting framework and the Markov Switching approach. Several important results stand out. 
First, the decomposition of the ex-post lending rate based on the accounting framework shows 
that high deposit rate is a key reason explaining the high lending rate in Mongolia. Operating 
costs and provisions for loan losses of banks are main factors explaining the relatively high 
interest rate spread. Provisions for loan losses have been pro-cyclical and compose most of the 
ex-post interest rate spread during the economic downturn. Second, Markov Regime-Switching 
approach shows that effects of some factors affecting bank interest rates and the interest rate 
spread vary over time depending on the regime (i.e., financial conditions and monetary policy). 
For example, when the growth of bank loans is low (regime 2 for the lending rate), the effect of 
inflation on the lending rate and the spread is statistically significant and the impact of NPL ratio 
on the bank lending rate and the spread is strong. It is also found that the interest rate pass-
through from the interbank market rate to the lending and deposit rates is slow, incomplete and 
changes over time. The results support the view that permitting asymmetry and non-linearity in 
responses of interest rate to changes in explaining factors are important in the interest rate 
analysis. Third, structures of credit and deposit markets and macroeconomic factors affect the 
lending rate and the interest rate spread regardless of which regime they are in. The market 
competition and concentration are important factors reflected in the setting of bank lending and 
deposit rates. Fourth, the factors affect the lending rate through different channels. Market 
structure, risks associated with lending operations (credit risk, interest rate risk, the interaction 
between the risks and inflation) and industrial product affect the lending rate transmitting 
through the interest rate spread, whereas the growth of M2 money and stock market development 
influence the lending rate channeling through the deposit rate. The interbank interest rate, 
economic activity and stock market development influences the lending rate through changing 
both the deposit rate and the interest rate spread. Finally, the analysis suggests that the high 
lending rate in Mongolia is compatible with underdeveloped stock market, low savings ratio, 
inefficient operating costs of banks, high credit risk, higher interbank market rate driven by 
unstable inflation, strong competition in deposit market and high concentration in the loan 
market. Overall, policy measures aiming to affect the deposit and lending rates should differ 
depending on the states of the rates since explanatory variables and time lags are different for 
each state. There is evidence that phase of business cycle is a leading indicator for state of 
deposit rate. 
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